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Abstract 
 
Reactivation of Indonesia’s full membership to the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) triggered discussion surrounding global petroleum 
governance. The country which decided to suspend its full membership at the end of 
2008, currently labelled as net oil importer. However, in OPEC terms Indonesia never 
really left, instead of the organization termed it as a "suspension”. Departing from the 
abovementioned context and perspectives, purpose of this essay is to answer the 
questions about the significance of the Indonesia’s membership reactivation to OPEC, 
and the strategic context of the reactivation in the current global oil market. In 
answering these questions, this article draws the dynamics of the relation of Indonesia 
and OPEC through the history in the first part and explores Indonesia’s interests in 
rejoining OPEC in the second one. In the third part, this essay will explore the possible 
benefit for OPEC as an organization as well as for its member countries could achieve 
by approving Indonesia’s request to reactivate its membership, despite its status as a 
net oil importer. 
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Introduction 
The submission of Indonesia’s 
official request to reactivate its full 
membership to the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
triggered discussion surrounding global 
petroleum governance. The country 
which joined OPEC in 1962, then decided 
to suspend its full membership at the end 
of 2008 mostly because of declining its oil 
production and rising domestic 
consumption. Indonesia has submitted 
the request to rejoin OPEC at September 8, 
2105 and OPEC has formally reactivate 
Indonesia’s full membership at the OPEC 
meeting in Vienna on Friday, December 4, 
2015. In a statement before the Vienna 
meeting, OPEC official said that ‚this will 
include the formalities of reactivating 
Indonesia’s membership of the 
organization… Indonesia has contributed 
much to OPEC’s history. We welcome its 
return‛ (Chilkoti & Raval, 2015). 
However, the improvement is not 
a great surprise as in OPEC terms 
Indonesia never really left, instead of the 
organization termed it as a "suspension‛. 
Since, before the case happened with 
Indonesia, the precedent has been made 
while Ecuador reactivates its OPEC 
membership in 2007, for a return from 
suspension. OPEC officials made clear the 
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door was always open. Despite 
Indonesia's current status as net oil 
importer had raised the question of 
whether the country would return as a 
full member given that OPEC's Statute 
says any country with a "substantial net 
export of crude petroleum" may become a 
full member (Lawler & Suroyo, 2015). 
OPEC expects that the Indonesia’s 
membership reactivation would add 
almost three percent to the organization's 
petroleum production, which already 
close to the peak. Currently, Indonesia has 
an oil output target of about 825,000 
barrels a day in 2015, roughly half of its 
peak production in the early 1990s 
(Chilkoti & Raval, 2015). Indonesia would 
also be the fourth-smallest producer 
among OPEC’s member before of Libya, 
Ecuador and Qatar, and bring the number 
of membership to 13 countries. Moreover, 
the important thing regarding OPEC’s 
global representation is the fact that 
Indonesia was the only Asian member for 
46 years before leaving the organization at 
the end of 2008, while oil prices reached 
its peak and the country turned into a net 
oil importer. It was the period while other 
oil exporting countries enjoyed the peak 
price and Indonesia suffered with its 
import, then evaluation of its OPEC 
membership made sense. 
 
Literature Review 
Global Petroleum Governance and Energy 
Security 
The ‘global struggle’ for energy 
has made the oil markets naturally cross-
border and inevitably framed by the 
politically defined rules of the game. 
‚Politics and power plays a big role with 
regard to how markets are organized,‛ 
Goldthau & Witte (2010) argued. 
Goldthau & Witte frame the global energy 
issues into two focuses; the first is on 
‘global energy governance’ that 
concentrates on markets and institutions 
that structure them. By this focus, energy 
becomes a multi-dimensional policy arena 
in which, as Stanislaw (2004: 17) sees, the 
issue is ‚not who is winning the battle *for 
access], but rather how the market can 
accommodate the divergent needs of the 
individual players and encourage the 
cooperation that has become more 
prevalent in recent years.‛ 
Nevertheless, Goldthau and Witte 
(2010) see the predominant issues are on 
the second focus, which pay more 
attention on the ‚competition among 
states to secure the energy supply that 
provides the key to continued prosperity 
and state power.‛ This zero-sum 
perspective maintains a paradigm that 
energy security is an exercise in 
geopolitical scheming and competition, 
and brings concerns to the balance of 
power among the actors. Chevalier (2009: 
19-20) sees the geopolitics of energy is 
associated with ‘the appropriation of oil 
money and its allocation through political 
decisions’ for the exporting countries; and 
‘the security of supply’ for the importing 
countries. 
According to Chevalier, the 
geopolitics of energy embraces energy 
policy, foreign policy and sometimes 
military action, because of three main 
reasons: first, the large consuming areas 
do not correspond to the large producing 
areas; second, oil production and 
consumption generate huge amounts of 
money; and third, the exporting countries 
which is grouping in OPEC have key role 
in determining the oil price and as the 
main benchmark for world energy 
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pricing. Moreover, for some particular 
cases, OPEC member countries also 
exercise oil as an instrument for political 
measure. 
Debates between the ‘global 
governance’ approach and ‘geopolitics 
and security’ approach largely mirror the 
Liberal versus Realist debate. Ziegler (in 
Guo and Hua, 2007: 197) sees the Liberals 
would argue that the growing 
interdependence might motivate the 
consumer nations to rely on the 
international oil market as well as 
transnational organizations. The Liberal 
arguments should eventually lead to 
broadened regional and global 
cooperation, rather than conflict. 
Markets dynamics are structured 
by the inter-states-created institutions that 
are certainly very political. A governance 
approach is far from neglecting the state 
and the role of governments in energy 
sector. On the other side, the states’ role is 
crucial in determining the quantity of 
energy supply at affordable prices and 
securing their investment in energy. 
Goldthau & Witte see this condition as a 
fact where the ‘governance’ perspective 
and the ‘geopolitics’ approaches actually 
intersect. 
Discussing global petroleum 
governance, we could not go through 
without concerning dynamics inside the 
most significant player in the global oil 
market, which is OPEC. Moreover, 
Gordon (in Maza, 2015) views that ‚OPEC 
is in the center of this paradigm shift.‛ 
The condition happened while OPEC as 
the organization of oil exporter countries 
reactivate Indonesia’s full membership in 
OPEC, despite Indonesia is currently 
labelled as net importer country. 
However, Deborah Gordon, Director of 
the Energy and Climate Program at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace explains that ‚the idea of nations 
that are oil exporters and others that are 
sheer oil importers is becoming fuzzy.‛ 
She gives the US as an example, despite 
the oil boom, the country remains an oil 
importer, yet the US export a tremendous 
amount of refined product. 
Departing from the 
abovementioned context and 
perspectives, purpose of this essay is to 
answer the questions about the 
significance of the Indonesia’s 
membership reactivation to OPEC, and 
the strategic context of the reactivation in 
the global oil market. In answering these 
questions, I will draw the dynamics of the 
relation of Indonesia and OPEC through 
the history in the first part and explore 
Indonesia’s interests in rejoining OPEC in 
the second one. In the third part, I will 
explore the possible benefit which OPEC 
as an organization and for its member 
countries could achieve by approving 
Indonesia’s request to reactivate its 
membership, despite its status as the net 
oil importer. 
Indonesia and OPEC’s Key Figures 
Indonesia was an early producer 
of oil started in the 1870s. Up to the 
Second World War, Indonesia produced 
148,000 barrels of oil per day. The energy 
industry boosted Indonesia’s economic 
growth during the 1970s and 1980s by 
accounting around 80% of the country’s 
annual exports and 70% of the central 
government’s annual revenues (Rosser, 
2007). LNG is also Indonesia’s most 
significant energy export and has been its 
largest foreign exchange earner (Stott, 
2008). Indonesia had been the largest LNG 
exporter for nearly three decades since 
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1977 to 2005, and its peak export was in 
1998 for around 36.1 billion cubic meters 
(Nugroho, 2010). Indonesia has estimated 
reserves of around 9 billion barrels of 
proven and potential crude oil and 182 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according 
to energy ministry data (Ali, 2007). 
In order to draw the real condition 
of Indonesia’s oil production and 
consumption, the chart from BP Statistical 
Review below (Figure 1) describes that 
Indonesia’s oil production reached its top 
in 1991 at 1.67 million barrels per day and 
has declined steadily since then. 
Meanwhile, domestic consumption 
reached a high of 1.64 million barrels per 
day in 2014. We also could see that year 
2003 was the turning point when 
consumption began to surpass 
production, then Indonesia left OPEC by 
the end of 2008. From 2004 to 2014, the 
average gap between production and 
consumption has been 438,000 barrels per 
day. By comparison, from 1990 to 2000, 
Indonesia produced on average 674,000 
barrels per day more than it consumed 
(Ashton, 2015). 
Figure 1. Indonesia Crude Oil Profile 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2015 
Another condition that makes 
Indonesia stand out relative to other 
OPEC members is the amount of its crude 
oil reserves. Chart from BP Statistical 
Review below (Figure 2) shows the 
diverging trend between Indonesia’s 
reserves and the reserves of OPEC as a 
whole from 1980 to 2014. In 1980, 
Indonesia accounted for 2.73% of OPEC’s 
total crude oil reserves, which is not a 
very large number, but certainly more 
than the insufficient 0.30% it has in 2015. 
So even with Indonesia’s involvement to 
OPEC, it is coming back as a much less 
significant member than in years past 
(Ashton, 2015). 
Figure 2. Total Proved Oil Reserves 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2015 
Despite that perspective, Indonesia 
had been playing important role in the 
global oil and gas industry. Particularly 
before its domestic production has 
declined over the past decade as 
producing oilfields have matured and 
investment and exploration have fallen 
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short. The country is now the world’s 20th 
largest oil producer, accounting for just 
over one percent of global oil production 
(Chilkoti & Raval, 2015). In terms of 
export capability, Indonesian 
Government’s data (Pusdatin ESDM, 
2014) informs that Indonesia exported 117 
million barrels in 2013, which was 
dropped about 47 percent compare to its 
export in 2000. 
Meanwhile, according to the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2015, 
Indonesia’s imports over the same period 
rose about 50 percent to 118 million 
barrels. Indonesia depended on overseas 
shipment to meet nearly one-third of its 
domestic oil demand in 2012. In terms of 
proved oil reserves, at the end of 2014 
Indonesia has stood at 3.7 billion barrels, 
compared with 267 billion in Saudi Arabia 
and 103 billion in Russia (Wulandari, 
2015). 
Indonesia’s Interests to Rejoin OPEC 
Indeed, the most interesting part 
in discussing this case study is to analyze 
reasons, purpose, or interests behind 
Indonesia’s reactivation of its full 
membership in OPEC. This part will 
explore about what interests are could be 
achieved by Indonesia as results of its 
effort to rejoin OPEC. 
Indonesia’s Economic Development 
Some analysts see that the 
reactivation of Indonesia’s membership in 
OPEC seems as a sensible strategy of the 
Indonesian government to secure its 
economic development program in the 
future. Especially since Indonesia’s GDP 
growth rate has been increasing and it is 
projected to accelerate in the next couple 
years. As described by chart from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) below 
about Indonesia’s economic growth 
expectations for the next few years. 
Figure 3. GDP Growth Rate of Four 
ASEAN Countries 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
From the above projection data, 
the IMF also expects other countries in 
Southeast Asia region to have broadly 
stable growth rates. Aston (2015) analyses 
some countries such as both Malaysia and 
Thailand are projected to have grown at 
around 5% and 4%, respectively, while the 
IMF forecasts that the Philippines’s 
growth will slow slightly from 6.7% in 
2015 to 6% by 2018. In the meantime, 
Indonesia will be one of the only countries 
with accelerating GDP growth, rising 
from 5.2% in 2015 to 6% in 2018. 
This economic growth will require 
much more resources, especially energy. 
Set of statistical data from BP Statistical 
Review (BP, 2015) shows how energy 
demand in these four economies has 
changed over the last 14 years. Ashton 
(2015) also estimates that Indonesia has 
always had a higher energy requirement, 
causing the country’s primary energy 
consumption to pull further away from 
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Malaysia and the Philippines. He claims 
that it is easier to understand reason 
behind Indonesian government’s 
eagerness to rejoin OPEC, despite the fact 
that Indonesia doesn't need to export oil 
to restore relations with its fellow oil 
exporting countries. 
Figure 4. Primary Energy Consumption 
of Four ASEAN Countries 
Source: BP Statistical Review (2015) 
On the other side, as global oil 
prices dropped, Indonesian government 
won acclaims for cutting expensive fuel 
subsidies and promising to redirect 
government spending to more productive 
infrastructure projects. However the sharp 
drop of oil price is not unambiguously 
positive for the Indonesian economy, 
given the large domestic oil consumption 
and the government’s obligation to cover 
the oil price subsidy. As Indonesia’s status 
is net oil importer, finally the net impact 
for the country should be positive. Sacha 
Winzenried, an analyst in Jakarta says 
that ‚The problem is at the state budgets, 
government still generates significant 
revenue from oil sales… Clearly [the 
industry is] still a significant employer 
and a very significant taxpayer‛ (Chilkoti 
& Raval, 2015). 
Securing Source of Oil Supply 
As net oil importer, Indonesia 
strategically needs to secure source of oil 
supply from other exporting countries in 
order to guarantee its economic 
development. It is clearly stated by the 
newly-appointed Indonesian governor for 
OPEC, Widhyawan Prawiraatmadja who 
explains that reactivation of Indonesia’s 
membership in OPEC would help Jakarta 
to strengthen relations with large exporter 
countries which are also Indonesia’s 
traditional friends in the oil trading. 
Prawiraatmadja confidently stated about 
Indonesia’s formal involvement within 
OPEC ‚gives us a lot of benefit‛ (Chilkoti 
& Raval, 2015). 
Another analyst, Berndt (2015) is 
sure that Indonesia itself will gain 
maximum benefits from reactivation of its 
OPEC membership. She says that 
‚Indonesia is well aware of the challenges 
inherent in a growing, urbanizing 
population. Having guaranteed energy 
suppliers among OPEC nations will 
increase overall energy security, and 
Indonesia will benefit by shoring up 
relationships while OPEC nations are 
frantic for consumer markets.‛ 
Therefore, Ashton (2015) sees that 
Indonesia's main drive to reactivate its 
OPEC full membership is more about 
building bridges to crude oil suppliers 
than it is about being part of an oil 
exporting organization. It is reasonable 
that since Indonesia has not been an oil 
exporter, it appears to be looking to access 
the group’s network to ‘help’ the other 
members offload their oil supply. 
Practically, Indonesia has been importing 
oil from other OPEC members, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Nigeria to fulfill its 
rising domestic oil consumption. The 
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chart below from the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) draws 
that Indonesia imports its oil supply 
mostly from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and 
Azerbaijan. 
Figure 5. Indonesia Crude Oil Imports 
by Source, 2013. 
 
Source: US Energy Information Agency, 2013 
However, another analyst sees that 
the OPEC’s approval for Indonesia’s 
proposal to rejoin the organization is 
confusing. An analyst on the oil and gas 
sector from a Jakarta-based Wood 
Mackenzie sees that ‚to have good 
contacts, which membership of OPEC 
would give them, would help them in 
procuring or negotiating competitive 
deals.‛ Despite, the analyst sees that 
OPEC member’s decision to allow 
Indonesia back in was ‚perplexing‛, 
because it will give a significant buyer of 
crude oil a window into discussions on 
production and pricing (Chilkoti & Raval, 
2015). 
With the reactivation, Indonesia is 
believed to gain biggest benefits from the 
closer relation with other 12 OPEC 
member countries. Indonesia will be 
securing a guaranteed energy supply 
from any other OPEC countries that will 
also increase overall energy security. 
Indonesia could also play its position as 
the importer country by tighten up 
relationships while OPEC nations are 
desperate for consumer markets. Berndt 
(2015) suggests that Indonesia urgently 
needs OPEC technological expertise and 
investment to develop its domestic 
resources. Indonesia’s aging energy 
infrastructure is desperately in need of 
modernization and the risky business 
environment has historically discouraged 
foreign investment. 
Then Ashton (2015) continue to 
analyze that despite on the surface, the 
market seems to expect Indonesia’s return 
to OPEC to lead to increased output, 
adding to the surplus in the global crude 
oil supply. Instead, it seems that the 
country’s return to OPEC actually 
represents a series of ‘shifting loyalties’ to 
ensure security of supply and procure the 
crude oil needed to fuel its future 
economic growth. The resulting impact on 
markets is likely to surprise when it is 
realized that Indonesia’s rejoin to OPEC is 
more than just being in the exporting 
group of countries. 
Investment for the Domestic Petroleum 
Industry 
It has widely known that 
Indonesia’s problem is not only about its 
demand of crude oil supply from other 
countries, but also problem with its lack 
capability to refine its domestic crude oil 
production. Indonesia is very dependent 
in importing refined oil from its small 
neighbor country, Singapore. Because of 
that, Berndt (2015) analyzes that 
Indonesia needs OPEC countries’ 
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investment and their technological 
expertise to develop its domestic oil 
industry. The country’s aging petroleum 
industry infrastructure is desperately in 
need of renovation and the risky business 
environment has historically discouraged 
foreign investment. 
In solving the abovementioned 
problem, the Indonesian Ministry of 
Energy targets to increase its oil refining 
capacity to 1.73 million barrels a day by 
2025. It is a ten year-target that Indonesia 
will start in 2016 by gaining about 1.23 
million barrels a day of refined product. 
The ten-year target will require 
investment of $23.6 billion which will 
include construction of two new 
refineries. Edward Morse, Citigroup Inc.’s 
global head for commodity research, 
analyzes that with plans to expand 
refineries faster than it can increase crude 
output, demand for imported oil, and 
financing for the new plants, is set to rise 
further. He suggests that ‚the most likely 
place they’re going to get refinery 
investment is going to come from Middle 
East producer. They’re keenly aware of 
competition for market share by Middle 
East producers. They can enhance that 
competition by having their nose under 
that tent‛ (Wulandari, 2015). 
In order to realize Indonesia’s 
interest to build more oil refineries, Saudi 
Arabia is the foremost country to make an 
agreement to build Indonesia and Saudi’s 
first jointly owned refinery in the 
Southeast Asia. The Indonesia’s energy 
minister Sudirman Said explains that the 
refinery is tentatively planned to have 
capacity of 300,000 barrels a day, although 
he declined to give a cost estimate. 
Additionally, minister Said expected that 
the refinery could be the first outcome of 
Indonesia’s formal acceptance as a 
member of the OPEC. 
The expectation is on its way to be 
implemented, while the Indonesian state 
oil producer PT. Pertamina agreed with 
Saudi Arabian Oil Company and JX 
Nippon Oil & Energy Corporation to 
upgrade two existing Pertamina’s 
refineries.  Pertamina President Director, 
Dwi Soetjipto calculated that the 
proposals are requiring $5 billion of 
investments for each upgrading project 
(Mahdi & Sergie, 2015). 
Furthermore, minister Said 
acclaims that Saudi Aramco will be 
potentially handle one of the projects 
because it is already involved in a Cilacap 
revamping project with Pertamina, and 
the Saudi ‚has promised crude oil supply 
and investment in the petrochemical 
industry.‛ Minister Said was referring to a 
recent deal by Saudi Aramco and 
Pertamina to team up and improve the 
capacity of the Cilacap refinery, with an 
estimated investment total of US$5.5 
billion (Cahyafitri, 2015). 
Indonesia’s plan to develop 
refinery facility through its state owned 
company Pertamina, has also been 
attracting some petroleum companies 
mostly from OPEC member countries as 
strategic partners. Pertamina invites them 
to participate in its RDMP (Refinery 
Development Master Plan) projects to 
upgrade and expand five existing 
domestic refineries (Cilacap; Balongan; 
Dumai; Plaju; and Balikpapan) from 820 
MBD of aggregate processing capacity to 
1,680 MBD. Especially for Aramco, 
Pertamina designated the Saudi company 
as biggest partner by involving in three of 
the five refineries, which are Cilacap and 
Balongan in Java; and Dumai in Sumatra. 
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As Saudi Aramco website (2015) 
describe that particularly for the Cilacap 
refinery upgrade will facilitate to process 
more sour crudes, produce refined oil 
with specifications of Euro IV standard. 
The Cilacap will expand its capacity into 
370 MBD of refined products, beside that 
it is also produce lubricant base oils and 
petrochemicals. And the most important 
thing for Indonesia’s energy security is 
about the agreement that includes a long-
term supply agreement for Arabian 
crudes to Cilacap refinery. 
From the Saudi’s point of view, the 
Saudi Aramco explains that their 
participation in the Pertamina’s long term 
program –which is called as ‘Refinery 
Development Master Plan’ (RDMP)— will 
benefit the company with a major growth 
component which is in line with their 
portfolio ambition to expand their 
downstream business globally. Moreover, 
Saudi Aramco is also account their join 
project with Pertamina as part of their 
expansion strategy with the ambition to 
improve Saudi Aramco as world leading 
and integrated energy and chemicals 
company. The investment would take 
place within a high growth petroleum 
demand in South East Asia which has 
been reserved in the company’s 
downstream strategy. 
Involvement in the OPEC Policy Making 
Process 
With Indonesia’s formal 
membership, gives the country ticket to 
involve in the decision making process 
inside OPEC. Despite such a condition 
will also raise such a dilemma on the 
OPEC decision making table that they 
should listen to any other essentially 
different interest. Because with 
Indonesia’s status as net importer 
country, the country will prefer to 
decrease crude oil price in order to get 
cheaper crude oil in the global market. 
But, at the same time, the other twelve 
exporting countries will tend to push 
OPEC to make decision that conducive for 
higher crude oil price. 
In this context, Indonesia’s 
involvement inside OPEC will also be 
potentially creates a new variable of 
conflict inside the organization. The 
potential conflict will be appeared 
especially when OPEC comes to a 
discussion to decide the amount of oil 
production quota that will affect the total 
supply and demand in the global oil 
market. According to Rahman (2015) in an 
interview with author, this kind of 
OPEC’s internal dynamics frequently 
happened along the organization’s 
history, particularly when they come to 
decide the accumulative OPEC’s 
production quota and specific production 
quota for each member countries. 
Indonesia’s membership 
reactivation in OPEC will affect most of its 
member countries, moreover in an era of 
unprofitable production. However, 
Berndt (2015) analyzes that for Saudi 
Arabia, the Indonesia’s reactivation is 
incrementally align with the strategic goal 
to expand its market share. However, 
some OPEC member will not be pleased 
by the addition of another different voice 
to the bargaining table. The tight oil 
export-depending countries like 
Venezuela, Nigeria, and other struggling 
nations have long been pressuring Saudi 
Arabia to cut production, and will now 
meet an incoming member with very 
different priorities. Berndt (2015) further 
analyzes that while OPEC’s struggling 
producers have structured their economy 
around high oil prices, Indonesia will 
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continue to remain a net oil importer with 
its own interest to keep oil prices low, to 
accelerate its domestic growth. Indonesia 
has a challenging road ahead to regain 
influence among OPEC’s disgruntled 
members, especially after its seven years 
absent. 
However, Indonesia’s position 
regarding how to manage oil production 
quota inside the OPEC is quite moderate. 
This position was reflected from the 
country’s new-appointed governor for 
OPEC, Widhyawan Prawiraatmadja’s 
statement that the collapse of crude oil 
price will give negative impact in the 
overall energy industry. The 
consequences will not only suffer for the 
exporting countries, but also for the 
importer countries. Prawiraatmadja 
further warns that the collapse of crude 
oil prices has worsened an ‚increasingly 
unappealing‛ energy investment climate 
and dependence on foreign oil grows. He 
says ‚Our interest is to keep prices from 
rising too high and from falling too low… 
If Indonesia is a part of OPEC, we can be 
sure that OPEC’s policy is in line with our 
interests‛ (Wulandari, 2015). 
OPEC’s Interests to receive Indonesia 
In the condition of rock-bottom oil 
prices, adding more amount of supply to 
the global energy surplus through the 
integration of an additional member 
appears counter-productive. As Berndt 
(2015) analyzes that reactivation of 
Indonesia’s membership seems as inviting 
new problem into the exporting countries 
group. However, it is an impossible for 
the oil exporter organization to open their 
door for a net importer country without 
any benefit that they want to achieve. In 
this part, we are going to explore interests 
behind OPEC’s decision to allow 
Indonesia to rejoin as full member of 
OPEC, despite with the country’s status as 
a net oil importer. 
 
Representativeness of OPEC Membership 
While Indonesia returns to join 
OPEC, the country become the fourth-
smallest producer in the organization 
before Libya, Ecuador and Qatar, and it 
brings the number of participants become 
13 countries. Despite Indonesia’s oil 
production is not as big as most of OPEC 
member countries, Indonesia has been 
playing significant position in the global 
petroleum market. Indonesia could also 
position itself as the country which could 
fill in the ‘blank spot’ of ‘global 
representativeness’ of OPEC. As the only 
Asian country which involve in the oil 
exporter group, Indonesia could 
symbolize the OPEC’s representation 
beside Middle Eastern countries’ 
dominance. Global representativeness is 
quite important for OPEC for the sake of 
getting recognition as an international 
organization. This is concurring with 
analysis of an energy and foreign policy 
specialist from Georgetown University, 
Brenda Shaffer that ‚Indonesia is OPEC’s 
only member in Asia, and Jakarta’s return 
extends OPEC’s global coverage‛ (Maza, 
2105). 
Moreover, with the shifting of 
global economic epicenter from the 
western countries into Asia, global oil 
market players have been going to pay 
more attention into the region. This 
phenomenon is growing alongside with 
the rising economic power of the Asian 
countries. OPEC countries need to 
maintain their link to the Asian petroleum 
market, as it is also has been the most 
growing oil market compare to any other 
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regions. Therefore, involvement of a 
country which has significant political 
and economic position in the region is 
very important. Moreover, Indonesia is 
currently also recognized as third largest 
democracy in the world, which also has 
been liberalizing its economy, and 
according to the World Bank (2014), it is 
positioned as the tenth largest economy in 
the world  
These set of political and economic 
status of Indonesia, bring more 
representative identity that make OPEC 
seems friendlier to the global liberal 
market. The Indonesia’s global status 
could be compared to any other OPEC 
member countries that have not embrace 
liberal democracy and market economy as 
practiced by Indonesia yet. These set of 
global political and economic status, are 
positioned Indonesia in the better relation 
among countries with the liberal or 
market economy, which are mostly 
grouped at the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
To be sure, control over the global 
oil market is still a looked-for significance 
of Indonesia’s reentry into OPEC. Maza 
(2015) analyzes that Saudi Arabia has a lot 
to gain from obtaining a grip in Asia. 
Regional stability in Asia, where the oil 
exporter organization could benefit from a 
growing demand for refined products, is 
important for the organization in the long 
run. Consequently, it is in OPEC’s interest 
to promote economic stability in the 
region and to incorporate Indonesia, 
which despite being a net importer, is still 
an important player in the global oil 
market. 
Securing Sustainable Demand for Oil 
In the time of economic 
slowdown, supply and demand 
conditions of oil in the global market 
become imbalance. The emerging 
economies which should be the 
locomotive of the global economy are 
decreasing their demand for oil, as a 
consequence of the shortage of order to 
generate their production machines. 
Moreover with the increasing production 
of the shale oil by the United States, total 
supply of oil in the global petroleum 
market become much higher compare to 
the demand. 
The condition generates tensions 
among OPEC member countries, as 
struggle over market share and increasing 
concerns following economic slowdown 
in China as the largest oil importer in the 
world. Amid the condition, Chilkoti & 
Raval (2015) analyze that most of oil 
exporting countries in the OPEC, 
especially Saudi Arabia –as the 
organization’s de facto leader and largest 
producer— have been courting consumer 
countries in Asia such as China, India and 
Indonesia to secure buyers for crude 
during the global oil surplus. They 
explain that OPEC countries are 
desperately looking for markets and 
retaining market share and there is a fit 
for them getting convenient with 
Indonesia. 
Analyses that the exporting 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia is very 
eager to expand its market in Asia, 
especially in Indonesia, are supported by 
statement of the President and CEO of 
Saudi Aramco, Amin H. Al-Nasser that 
‚Indonesia is a rising powerhouse in the 
global economy, and has long deep rooted 
trade and cultural ties with Saudi Arabia. 
Its refining sector has enormous potential, 
and with Indonesia’s fast-growing 
demand for refined products‛ said the 
President of the Saudi’s petroleum 
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company. Furthermore, Al-Nasser 
continued to explain the Saudi’s intention 
to involve deeper in Indonesia, "Indonesia 
is an important country for Saudi Arabia, 
a rising global economy, we would like to 
be a part of the growth of Indonesia" 
(Asmarini, 2015b).  
Furthermore, Berndt (2015) 
analyzes that the reasons behind Saudi 
Arabia’s latest strategy to support the 
Indonesia’s reintegration into OPEC is 
both market-driven and geopolitical. With 
the abundance of the US shale and the 
slowing of China’s economy, OPEC is 
increasingly driven to view new energy 
customers. As OPEC’s suspended 
member for seven year, Indonesia has 
high population and enormous growth 
potential will demand greater energy 
resources over the next few decades. 
Indonesia is also home to the world’s 
fourth largest population beside it is also 
the world’s tenth largest economy with a 
projection to have high growth over the 
next few decades. Indonesia’s potential is 
very advantageous for the oil exporting 
organization to market their surplus of oil. 
Moreover, referring to the 
International Energy Agency (2015), the 
projected energy consumption of the 
entire Southeast Asia region is estimated 
to rise 80 percent by the year 2040. Among 
these total consumption of Southeast 
Asian countries, International Energy 
Agency (2015) also predicts Indonesia will 
import 40 percent of its oil consumptions 
by 2018. That is why Indonesia’s 
economic potential is very prospective for 
OPEC member countries, as the group of 
oil exporter are getting the net oil 
importer country in their midst. 
 
Mediation to the Consumer Countries 
(IEA of OECD) 
As a suspended member of OPEC 
and currently become net importer 
country, indeed Indonesia has unique 
position when the country rejoined to 
OPEC. Besides that, Indonesia also has 
another unique position while in the same 
time the country could successfully 
reactivate its full membership into the 
group of oil exporting countries, on the 
other side Indonesia has also received an 
approval to become a part of the group of 
oil importer countries. As already 
announced, Indonesia currently has also 
been formally join to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the organization 
which dedicated to serve interests of the 
oil importer countries, particularly within 
the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The process of Indonesia’s 
entrance into the IEA was taking place 
while Indonesia received an offering as 
new member of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) during the G20 Energy 
Minister Meeting in Istanbul, Turkey at 
early October 2015. The offering was 
delivered directly by Director of IEA, 
Fatih Birol to the Indonesian Minister of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, Sudirman 
Said. The document of the Joint 
Ministerial Declaration of the 2015 IEA 
Ministerial meeting (2015b) stated that 
Indonesia received an approval together 
with other countries such as China and 
Thailand and was officiated as associated 
member during the IEA meeting in Paris, 
November 18 2015. 
The Indonesia’s two positions both 
in the group of exporter and the group of 
importer, potentially equip Indonesia to 
play better role in the two sides of the 
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market players. Some officials in the 
OPEC analyze that Indonesia’s 
involvement inside the oil exporter 
organization will provide insight from the 
point of view of oil consumers (Tan, 2015). 
Rahman (2015) also analyze that OPEC 
could gain benefit from Indonesia’s 
position as net importer country and also 
member of the IEA to provide view from 
the oil importer perspective. Furthermore 
in the interview, Rahman (2015) also 
explain that Indonesia could also become 
a ‘bridge’ between oil exporter group and 
oil consumer group. By viewing from the 
‘bridging’ perspective that could be acted 
by Indonesia, OPEC and IEA or OECD 
could utilize Indonesia as a ‘liaison party’ 
that could convey views from one side to 
the other. 
Geopolitical Interest in Malacca Strait 
One more strategic thing that 
could also beneficial for OPEC by 
reactivating Indonesia’s membership is 
related to the country’s geopolitical 
position. Berndt (2015) analyzes that as 
the sole Asian member of OPEC, 
Indonesia could serve as a geopolitical 
gateway into Southeast Asian and East 
Asian markets. Moreover, Indonesia’s 
strategic position become actual when 
Indonesia could supervises the Malacca 
Strait, which plays as one of the most 
important choke points through which 
15.2 million barrels of oil passage every 
day from global suppliers to consumers in 
fast growing economic region of Asia. 
This condition will benefit more 
for OPEC, while its member at the 
controls of one of the world’s major oil 
transportation routes that could improve 
the security of OPEC supplies to the most 
growing oil market in the world. An 
energy and foreign policy analyst, Brenda 
Shaffer confirms this perspective that 
Indonesia also straddles the Malacca 
Strait, a major global oil transit waterway 
that is likely to see increased traffic as 
Asian energy demand grows. That is why 
Shaffer importantly notes that Indonesia’s 
OPEC membership reactivation not only 
meaningful for the economic interests but 
also gives OPEC more control over the 
transport of oil from core producers to 
core consumers, which is also beneficial in 
terms of geopolitical perspectives (Maza, 
2105). 
Conclusion 
The reactivation of Indonesia’s 
membership to OPEC gives benefit not 
only for Indonesia, but also for OPEC. 
Since Indonesia became net oil importer 
and therefore it decided to suspend its full 
membership at the end of 2008, the 
country positioned itself as oil consumer 
which creates a diametric gap from the 
group of oil exporter. However, after 
about seven years of membership 
suspension, Indonesia decided to 
reactivate its full membership in OPEC, 
despite its oil production has been 
decreasing and it has to import more oil. 
On the other side, OPEC also welcomes 
Indonesia’s intention to rejoin the group 
of oil exporting countries.  
The condition seems presenting 
such an inconsistency in the OPEC’s 
maneuver responding the decrease of oil 
demand in the global market. However 
the view is refused by Deborah Gordon, 
who explains that ‚the idea of nations that 
are oil exporters and others that are sheer 
oil importers is becoming fuzzy.‛ She 
takes the US as an example that despite 
the oil boom, the country still remains as 
an oil importer, but in the same time it 
also exports a big amount of refined 
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product. Gordon argues that globalization 
has been changing the character of oil 
market and industry, and she views that 
OPEC is currently in the center of the 
paradigm changing process. 
Concluding from the above 
analysis, we could see that the article 
presents Indonesia’s interests in rejoining 
OPEC, which are providing sufficient 
demand of oil in order to support the fast 
growing of Indonesia’s economic 
development, the second one is about the 
mission to secure the external supply of 
oil that should be imported from the 
global oil market, the third is about the 
need to look for foreign investment and 
technological support in order to 
modernize petroleum industry in 
Indonesia, especially to develop the 
refinery facility. And the fourth is about 
the need to be involved in discussing 
global petroleum dynamics inside the 
decision making process in the OPEC.  
On the other side, this paper also 
tries to identify interests of OPEC in 
accepting Indonesia to reactivate its full 
membership in OPEC, which are the 
global representation of OPEC 
membership, the second one is to 
strengthen direct access into Indonesia as 
a potential market that has fast growing 
demand of the imported oil, the third one 
is to gain important views from Indonesia 
as it is could bring the consumer 
perspectives into the OPEC decision 
making process and also to play bridging 
with the group oil importer countries (IEA 
or OECD), which Indonesia is also 
member of it, and the fourth one is about 
geopolitical motive that related to interest 
in Malacca Strait as Indonesia could serve 
as a geopolitical gateway into Southeast 
Asian and East Asian markets. 
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